The growing concern over health risks associated with food products is at the forefront of trade policy debate. At the center of this debate is the role of the "precautionary principle." This framework for decision making holds that precaution against health, environmental, and safety risks should be exercised even when scientific evidence of risk is unclear. This paper quantifies the impact of standards on aflatoxins implemented by the EU on food exports from African countries. The authors estimate the impact of changes in differing levels of protection based on the EU standard and those suggested by international standards, for 15 European countries and 9 African countries between 1989-1998. The results suggest that the implementation of the new aflatoxin standard in the EU will have a significant negative impact on African exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe. The EU standard, which would reduce health risk by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year, will decrease these African exports by 64 percent or US$ 670 million in contrast to regulation set at an international standard.
I. Introduction
While traditional trade barriers in agriculture such as tariffs continue to decline, technical and regulatory barriers are increasingly subject to debate. This includes discussion over the appropriate levels of sanitary and phytosanitary standards (Wilson, 2000) . Public discourse and concern about the health risks of food and appropriate sanitary standards have been emerging in industrialized countries (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2000) , and they have been especially prominent in Europe (Nielsen and Anderson, 2000) . The use of import bans and regulatory intervention by the European Commission is increasingly justified, in part, under the precautionary principle which seeks to mitigate against risk even under conditions in which science has not established direct cause and effect relationships. The Commission's approach has been challenged, therefore, in trade policy talks on the basis that import restrictions have been employed without sufficient support in international science. The ban in Europe of hormone-treated beef is one recent and high profile example.
The cost of regulatory intervention by any nation with the intent to protect human health can be significant. This is especially true for developing countries attempting to penetrate developed country markets. In low and middle-income countries, the share of food exports in total trade remained high at approximately 13 percent in the 1990's (See Fig. 1 ). If increasingly restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary measures limit market access, these countries may incur significant export losses. Many questions remain, however, including how to approach the trade-off between appropriate levels of risk to human health and costs of differing levels of protection set in standards to international trade. In addition, we know little about the specific impact of harmonized standards shared across national boundaries, in contrast to divergent national standards.
Measuring the trade effect of sanitary and phytosanitary standards is particularly complex, as well documented in Orden and Roberts (1997) . Notwithstanding these complexities it is clear the costs of regulatory intervention can be high relative to nonintervention. Food exports subject to regulatory standards may involve rejection of imports following border inspection. Between June 1996 and June 1997 the U.S. rejection level of food additives imports from developing countries averaged 3 percent of total food imports.
1 The loss arising from rejection is not limited to the value of the product. It also includes transportation and other export costs, all of which are incurred by the exporter.
Compliance requirements on exporters impose non-trivial costs especially on developing countries, such as the cost of upgrading production systems, processing and storage equipment, and quality control stations (Henson et al., 2000) .
How regulatory costs for exporters compare with possible gains in higher sanitary and phytosanitary levels in importing countries is a key part of trade policy debate.
Information on how standards affect trade flows when an international standard is in place and shared bilaterally, as opposed to conditions in which differing national standards are imposed on exporters is increasingly valuable. As recently reviewed in Maskus and Wilson (in press ) the empirical evidence and information on the trade impact of standards is extremely limited. Union and 9 Africa countries in the ten years prior to 1998. Instead of identifying cost elements to comply with the standards, this paper examines changes in trade flows, as they are a direct consequence of differing approaches to regulation which intersect debate on how best to address these issues within the rules based system of the WTO.
II. Regulations on aflatoxin contamination and international standards
Aflatoxins are a group of structurally related toxic compounds which contaminate certain foods and result in the production of acute liver carcinogens in the human body.
They were discovered in 1960 following the deaths of 100,000 turkeys in the United Kingdom and high incidences of liver disease in ducklings in Kenya and hatchery trout in the United States (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2000) .
The major aflatoxins of concern are designated B1, B2, G1, and G2, and these toxins are usually found together in foods (UNDP 2 -FAO 3 , 2000). Aflatoxin B1 is usually predominant and the most toxic of the four categories and has been identified in corn and corn products, groundnuts and groundnuts products, cottonseed, milk, and tree nuts such In 1997 the European Commission proposed a uniform standards for total aflatoxins setting the acceptable level of the contaminant in certain foodstuffs. For example, it set a standard at 10 ppb in groundnuts subjected to further processing and at 4 ppb in groundnuts intended for direct human consumption (this category includes cereals, edible nuts, dried and preserved fruits). It also established a level for aflatoxin M1 which is usually present in milk at .05 ppb.
As noted in Henson et. al (2000) , the draft the Commission's regulation on aflatoxins triggered serious concerns among exporters of food products subject to the proposed directive. Exporting countries including Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, India, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Uruguay, Australia and Pakistan requested that the European Union provide the risk assessments on which it had based its proposed standard (WTO, G/SPS/R/12, 1998).
In comments submitted to the WTO a representative of the Gambia maintained that the proposed standard would "effectively restrict entry of the Gambia's groundnuts and essentially the groundnuts from producer countries in the developing world to the European Union" (WTO, G/SPS/GEN/50, 1998). Several Asian countries also expressed concern about the impact of the regulation on exports of cereals. Thailand had previously suffered from considerable losses in corn exports as a result of high levels of aflatoxins, and requested EU assistance to developing countries that export products subject to the new regulation (WTO, G/SPS/GEN/57, 1998).
The sampling procedure mandated in the Commission's standard is noteworthy.
Sampling is one of the most important contributors to the variability of analyses and identification of aflatoxin contamination due to the non-homogeneous nature of aflatoxin distribution in foods. The EU regulation is similar to the Dutch Code (3x10 kg) which requires that three tests are conducted on a randomly drawn 30 kg. Each sample has to pass the three tests before the shipment is allowed to enter the market. In the case of bulk raw nuts the implementation of this procedure presents difficulties because, as noted earlier aflatoxin is not evenly distributed throughout an entire batch.
Regulations currently under discussion by CODEX, would require that the average aflatoxin levels in the samples meet the standard, rather than each sample independently.
The U.S. also requires that the average aflatoxin levels in the three samples meet the standard (U.S. groundnuts industry. Interview on 9 th August 2000). Under the proposed CODEX regulations three samples that have levels of aflatoxins equal to 20 ppb, 10 ppb, and 15 ppb would be accepted. The same samples could lead to the rejection of a whole shipment under the new EU regulations.
As a result of the objections raised by EU trading partners, the European Commission decided to relax the proposed aflatoxin levels in cereals, dried fruits and nuts (see Table 2 ). A July 1998 Commission's directive, established the total aflatoxin standard in groundnuts subject to further processing at 15 ppb (8 ppb for B1), in other nuts and dried fruit subject to further processing at 10 ppb (5 ppb for B1). It established a more stringent standards on cereals and dried fruits, and nuts intended for direct human consumption at 4 ppb (2 ppb for B1). According to the directive, EU members are to implement the necessary laws to comply with the new standards no later than 31 December 2000. For 8
EU members (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden) the new directives meant that they must reduce the acceptable aflatoxin levels in their imports of groundnuts by more than 50 percent.
While the European Commission established a 4 ppb levels for total aflatoxins in cereals, dried fruits, and nuts intended for direct human consumption, it set the standard for aflatoxin B1 at 2 ppb for food products intended for direct human consumption (See Table   2 ). These levels are significantly more stringent than those set by CODEX, which does establish a standard of B1 but assumes that 50-70 percent --or around 7.5-10.5 ppb of the total aflatoxin level of 15 ppb --is usually accounted for by aflatoxin B1 contamination.
The new Commission's standard for total aflatoxin contamination in dried fruits and nuts subjected to further processing is the same as that recommended by the CODEX.
The Australian standard for total aflatoxins in groundnut is set at 15 ppb. The United
States adopts 20 ppb as the maximum level for the contaminant in various agricultural and food products. What sets the new Commission's standard apart from international standards and those in other developed countries and produces a more stringent regulatory effect is the specific standard set for aflatoxin B1 and the sampling procedures outlined above.
Therefore, the international standard suggests that products which contain levels of aflatoxin B1 as high as 10 ppb would be acceptable for all types of food products. This is true if the total level of aflatoxins does not exceed 15 ppb. Similarly, U.S regulations, which set a 20 ppb standard for all types of groundnuts, would effectively allow B1 contamination levels that are as high as 14 ppb. Moreover, the FAO has recommended that testing a single 20 kg sample for aflatoxin content would yield results that are reliable enough to eliminate the risk for the consumer and that stricter requirements would not bring more significant safety measures (Saquib, 2000) .
III. Dependency of African Food Exports on the European Market and Compliance

Cost of Aflatoxin Standards
Western Europe and other high-income countries are the major export destinations for developing countries through 1995. 
IV. Empirical analysis
There is a limited number of studies that have used empirical data to estimate the trade effect of standards. Quantifying standards entails greater complexity since standards affect market demand and supply in various ways. Unlike tariffs, change in the equilibrium price cannot be predicted unless knowing how import demand and export supply shift, which are functions of many factors such as compliance costs and change in consumer's preference associated with improved product information and quality (Hooker and Caswell, 1999; Maskus and Wilson, in press) . A partial equilibrium approach has primarily been employed to analyze the demand, supply and welfare effect of standards (Paarlberg and Lee, 1998; Calvin and Krissoff, 1998) . These studies, however, assume a hypothetical relationship between food safety, demand, and supply as compliance costs and preference changes were not directly measured. Antle (1999) alone, and total level of aflatoxins B1, B2, G1 and G2 (See Table 1 ). In practice passing the B1 standard is more difficult than passing the standard for the total level of aflatoxins.
This is the standard that is more likely to affect trade flows.
Our specification of gravity equation is as follows: ε is the error term and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero.
We selected product categories for examination where data are available. We first conduct the analysis at an aggregate level that is defined by two digit under the STIC Revision 2 classification. The value of trade of 'cereals and cereal preparations' and 'fruits, nuts and vegetables' are regressed on the variables presented above.
United Nations trade data for 15 European countries and 9 African countries are used. The European countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom. The African countries include Chad, Egypt, the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. A fixed-effect model for importing countries as cross-sectional groups is used since the error term is considered to reflect common characteristics within a group of observations associated with each country.
We show in Table 4 that standards for aflatoxin B1 have significant negative effects on trade flows of both cereals and fruits, nuts and vegetables. It suggests that there are some sub-product-categories in both groups that were sensitive to the standards. In particular, most cereals were subject to the aflatoxins standards according to the FAO survey. Since a double-log specification is used, the coefficient of a variable can be interpreted as elasticity, and the greater coefficient estimate for cereals perhaps reflects this fact. The result implies that a 10 percent tightening of the aflatoxins standards (a 10 percent smaller maximum level of contamination) will reduce trade flow by 14.3 percent for cereals and 3.0 percent for fruits, nuts and vegetables. (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh) . These factors can possibly appear as nonmarket barriers and separating their effect from standards is necessary. Thus, colonial ties appear to have important implications for these predicted results.
The 'fruits, nuts and vegetables' category includes fresh, dried and preserved fruits and vegetables. Dried and preserved fruits, nuts and vegetables have been a particular focus of aflatoxin regulations since drying and preserving processes tend to grow fungus that contain aflatoxins. Consequently, we repeated the analysis under a greater disaggregation of these product categories. We focus on dried and preserved fruits, groundnuts and other nuts. Table 5 shows the elasticity of aflatoxin B1 standards on trade flows in different product sub-categories. The table suggests that the standards' effect is significant both on groundnuts and the other nuts, while the magnitude of the effect is greater on groundnuts reflecting a greater sensitivity of groundnuts trade to aflatoxin standards than the other nuts. It also indicates that the standard's effect on 'dried or preserved fruits' is significant. Thus, products under the category of 'fruits, nuts and vegetable' that are of the focus of the Commission's new regulation are expect to be affected when this regulation comes into force.
V. Simulations
This section provides results on how trade flows between Africa and Europe would differ under conditions in which (1) a standard developed using CODEX guidelines were imposed or (2) the European harmonized standard is imposed on African exports. The predicted trade flow in value under both scenarios is computed for each EU and African country for products analyzed in the previous section. An upper and a lower bounds for change in trade flow are imposed in order for the result to reflect the non-negative export and the capacity constraints on exports; i.e., trade flow will not increase or decrease by more than 100 percent.
As noted, CODEX does not set standards on aflatoxin B1 alone. In order to establish a baseline estimate for an international standard, we assume the 9 ppb for the studied products based on the standard on the level of total aflatoxins contamination (15 ppb).
Composition of aflatoxin B1 in all aflatoxins in food can vary across products and samples.
The variation is normally between 50 to 70 percent. We assume, therefore, that 60 percent of all aflatoxins are in fact aflatoxin B1 by adopting the average of these two bounds.
Given this assumption, aflatoxin B1 contamination should be below 9 ppb in order to sustain total aflatoxins below a 15 ppb level.
Cereals exhibit a significant difference between the two scenarios. As shown in These trade losses are estimated only for European and African countries. This simulation does not predict these countries' response of diverting trade partners. European countries is in particular likely to shift their food imports from Africa to other countries while they may have to pay higher prices than they did for African exports. African countries may not be able to find alternative markets outside Europe due to their high dependency on the European market. They will then have to chose whether to bear higher costs for transportation and accession to new markets or to invest in compliance to the new standards. This simulation also does not consider African countries' potential benefits from compliance. If African countries are able to comply with the European standards, liver cancer deaths of African population would decrease as well. These benefits will offset the export losses. While these issues are of great interest, they are beyond the scope of this simulation analysis.
VI. Implications
This The simulation is performed under two regulatory scenarios (1) an international standard indicated by guidelines set by CODEX and (2) the Commission's new standard.
It is found that the Commissions' standard will impose a considerable loss of export revenue in African countries. In particular, the Commission's standard will impose far greater trade impediments when compared with trade under an international standard for cereals and edible nuts trade. African export revenue from the 15 European countries is estimated to decrease by 59 percent for cereals and 47 percent for dried and preserved fruits and edible nuts. The total loss is estimated to be nearly US$ 400 million for cereals, dried and preserved fruits, and nuts under the Commission's new standard. Trade flow of these products is found to increase by nearly US$ 700 million if a standards is imposed based on an extension of current CODEX international standards.
Our results suggest several areas for consideration in a public policy context. One implication of the new standard on aflatoxins in Europe is the potential application of the risk reduction level to other contaminants in food. The EU directive was developed based on the JECFA risk assessment used by CODEX to establish a less stringent international standard. The fact that the EU decided to regulate aflatoxin B1 directly to achieve deaths risk reduction is not without cost. The JECFA risk assessment can suggest that 0.2 death per billion risk reduction will be achieved by reducing the aflatoxin B1 maximum allowable level by 1 ppb 8 , which implies for the case of cereals, dried and preserved fruits and edible nuts that 1.4 deaths per billion risk reduction will be achieved under the Commission's new standard (2 ppb) as opposed to the level that follows the CODEX guideline (9 ppb). This estimated reduction of liver cancer is small compared to the total number of deaths of liver cancer in the EU. WHO estimates approximately 33,000 people die from liver cancer every year in EU which has population of half billion.
The standard is also relevant in consideration of obligations in the WTO SPS Agreement. The Agreement recognizes the rights of member countries to determine the "appropriate levels of protection" of human health. The level set by Europe and our findings on the magnitude of the trade effect, however, raise important questions for consideration. These include the costs of a proliferation of national standards set in absence of CODEX setting an internationally agreed level for B1 directly, as well as how the WTO addresses the economic trade-off of individual interpretations of "appropriate protection" and "least trade distorting" in SPS cases with the type of empirical work now being conducted in analyses such as this one.
Finally, our results suggest several areas for further empirical research and extension of the analysis. A gravity-equation model is unable to disentangle demand and supply effect of standards. The application of a system of equations with unit prices would make welfare analysis feasible. The utility gain of consumers in the importing countries can thus be estimated and compared with welfare losses from the exporting countries. A dynamic of consumers and exporters' decision could also be considered in the model framework used in this paper. Compliance involves one-time costs of product re-design and building an administrative system as well as recurrent costs of maintaining quality control and testing and certification (Wilson and Maskus, in press ). Consumers' response also can better be modeled by incorporating their dynamic behavior since their current purchase decisions are typically influenced on their perception of product quality and safety that is characterized through repeated purchases. Notes:
1-inside parentheses are shares in parentage in total value of exports from a given region. The regions in the first column are origins of export of food products, and the regions in the first row are destinations for these products 2-excluding Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are included in the rest of high income countries. 2. '*' and '**' imply significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels under a two-tail test, respectively. 
